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Abdur Chowdhury
WTO accession: What’s in it for Russia?
Abstract
Prospects for Russia’s membership in the WTO now look better than any point since
accession negotiations began almost a decade ago. Good progress with economic and legal
reforms within Russia has left the country’s economy better prepared for membership.
Nevertheless, the economy still suffers from various weaknesses including, but not limited
to, pervasive subsidies for different sectors, lack of liberalization and foreign participation
especially in the service sector, inefficiency in custom administration, lack of enforcement
of intellectual property rights, etc. For all their sensitivity, the negotiations on the import
tariff levels and access to the service sectors are the least of the problems. Much more
difficult will be non-tariff barriers and the general trade-related legislative framework.
Resolving the remaining weaknesses would be a complex process. However, given the
importance of WTO-related measures for the overall domestic structural reform, any delay
in accession would be at least marginally negative for investor perceptions of country risk.
Key words:  Russia, WTO, tariff, reform
JEL classification: F1, P2
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1 Introduction
Russia applied to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) predecessor, the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), in June 1993 hoping to join the organization
before the end of the decade. However, a lack of initiative during the early years – which
can be attributed to a government that is relatively new and, in many areas, still in the
midst of formulating a legal and regulatory framework to meet a completely different
political and economic environment – led the entire process to run out of steam. Following
the 1998 financial crisis, when Russia devalued the rouble and defaulted on its debt, efforts
to keep the economy afloat left the authorities with little time to press ahead with WTO
preparations.
Active negotiations and discussions started again only after President Putin declared
WTO accession as one of the goals of his presidency. His declaration generated a genuine
political commitment that has enabled Russia to tackle a number of contentious accession
issues. In May 2001, Russia presented a report on ’Review of the Russian Trade Policies’
that will serve as the basis for the Protocal of Accession. In Spring 2002, WTO’s Working
Party on Russia’s accession reviewed the first draft of the report [Stern (2002)]. This
means that Russia has entered the final phase of the accession process, in which it will
negotiate the conditions of entry and implement the required legislative reforms. However,
because of the many disagreements between Russia and the other countries, this final stage
could take some time to complete [Yudaeva (2002a)].1
The aim of this paper is to discuss the potential accession conditions, the current state
of negotiations, as well as potential effects of the accession for Russia. An analysis of
Russia’s accession process is interesting for at least three reasons. First, the Russian
Federation is one of around 30 countries which are  currently seeking accession to the
WTO. Being one of the largest economies among the applicant countries, its accession has
great potential to increase trade that would benefit current WTO members as well as
Russia itself. On the other hand, its relative size and importance within the former Soviet
Union countries (CIS), many of whom are also in the WTO accession process,  mean that
Russia’s entry terms would have important implications for other countries [Hare (2002)].
In fact, there is already indication of this happening.
Second, when Russia initially applied to the WTO, its economy had a different
structure from traditional non-planned economies. A number of sectors (e.g., financial
services) did not exist, and a number of important regulations were not formally legislated.
Even now, after a decade of transition, formally legislated laws are not fully implemented
and enforced. This has a direct consequence for the economy and for the accession. Since
in many cases formal rules are absent and the economy is governed by a set of informal
rules, authorities at different levels enjoy substantial discretion. Consequently, a number of
WTO members have doubts about Russia’s ability to fulfill the obligations in the near
future.
Third, the fact that, like many of the other applicants, Russia is in the midst of a
process of economic reform and transition towards a market economy also makes the
accession process more complicated than it would be for an already well established
market economy.
                                                
1 Unless all unsolved issues are settled by the summer of 2003, Russia may not be able to join the
WTO over the next 2-3 years, in which case she might face some additional hurdles as new
requirements concerning anti-dumping measures and exports of labor force emerging from the
Doha Round are likely to be presented later.
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The paper begins with a discussion  of the composition and direction of Russia’s
foreign trade in Section 2. Section 3 provides a description of the negotiation process. The
benefits and hurdles on the way to WTO membership are presented in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. Empirical results analyzing the effect of WTO accession for the Russian
economy are reported in Section 6. The paper ends with concluding remarks.
2 Composition and Direction of Trade
In order to set the stage for discussion, this section presents some salient features of the
commodity and geographic composition of Russia’s foreign trade. In recent years, Russia
has experienced surplus in both merchandise trade and current account. Merchandise
surpluses have been huge, culminating in a surplus of $60 billion in 2000, $48 billion in
2001, $46 billion in 2002, and about $15 billion in the first three months of 2003 (Table 1).
Crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and metal are Russia’s main exports,
accounting for about two-thirds of the export earnings in 2002 (Table 2). Russia’s current
account has also shown record surplus – about $33 billion or 10.5 percent of GDP in 2002
(Table 1).
 As shown in Table 2, Russia’s merchandise exports in 2002 totaled $100 billion.2
Europe was the leading destination of Russian exports with 56 percent followed by Asia
(including China and Japan) at 18 percent and CIS at 15 percent (Table 3). Only about 4
percent of Russian exports went to the United States.
Russia’s total merchandise imports in 2002, exclusive of barter and shuttle trade, was
$42 billion (Table 4). Again, Europe was the major source of imports (49. percent)
followed by the CIS countries (22. percent). Asia (including China and Japan) accounted
for about 15 percent while the USA’s share was slightly higher than 6 percent (Table 5). In
terms of commodity composition, machines (equipment and instruments) and chemicals
(including pharmaceuticals and rubber) account for a combined 53 percent of total imports
while food and agricultural products account for 23 percent [Stern (2002)].
An analysis of these figures will show that Russia’s exports and imports are
concentrated geographically with the EU, CIS, and Central and Eastern Europe. It enjoys a
comparative advantage in raw materials and low value added products including oil, gas,
metals, timber and artificial fertiliser; while its comparative disadvantage is in certain types
of industrial products and, to a lesser degree, in services and agricultural products [Stern
(2002), Yasin (2002)].
                                                
2 This figure does not include barter and what has come to be known as ’shuttle trade’ where
individuals or groups frequently travel abroad and buy items including clothing, used cars, etc. to
bring them to Russia for resale.
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3 The Negotiation Process3
Pursuant to the established procedure, a Working Party (WP) on accession, consisting of
representatives of interested GATT countries, was formed in June, 1993. The mandate of
the Working Party (transformed into the Working Party on Russia’s WTO accession after
the WTO’s establishment) was to study the trade regime in Russia and negotiate the
requirements for Russia’s participation in the WTO. As of June 2003, there are 67 member
countries in the Working Party.
Negotiations on Russia’s accession to WTO started in 1995. The WP has met on
numerous occasions. Until April 2003, nineteen meetings of the WP have been held to
examine the accession application and eventually submit recommendations, which may
include the draft Protocal of accession, to the General Council.4
Initially, the WP focused on a detail study of the economic mechanisms, trade and
political regime in Russia at multilateral level in terms of their conformity with the WTO
rules and regulations. During 1998-99, Russia presented its preliminary proposals on tariffs
(the list of the maximum admissible import customs duties), agriculture (measures to
support national agricultural production and subsidize exports of agricultural products and
food), and provision of free access to the national services market (the list of obligations to
provide free access and the list of exceptions from the most-favored nation clause.
Russia has also initiated a series of bilateral negotiations with all the interested
members of the WP on the terms and conditions of Russia’s membership in WTO. The
negotiations are in the areas of agriculture, the customs system (and customs union and
other trade arrangements with CIS States), excise taxation and national treatment, import
licensing, industrial subsidies, national treatment, Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT), Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and services.
The latest round of talks included multilateral discussions on sanitory measures,
access of services to the Russian market, import tariff quotas and agriculture, as well as
bilateral talks on access of goods and services to the Russian market. The first bilateral
agreement on access of goods to the Russian market has been signed. Russian legislations
are also being brought in line with the norms and rules of the key WTO Agreements. The
government has also submitted to the Duma the last draft law included in its WTO
package. However, the most controversial issues still lie ahead, e.g., agricultural subsidies;
EU demands that Russian domestic energy prices be better aligned with world market
prices; access to Russian markets for telecommunications, finance, and transportation
services markets; and demands that Russia accede to a voluntary agreement governing
trade in civil aircraft (BOFIT, 2003).
                                                
3 For a discussion of the main procedural aspects of accession to the WTO, see the WTO website
www.wto.org .
4 The minutes of each of these meetings are available at the website (www.wto.ru) maintained by
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation.
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Key concerns in these negotiations include:5
 subsidization of agriculture – in particular, Russia's claims to enter the WTO with
subsidies above levels utilised in recent years;
 customs formalities and administration, including customs valuation – Russia is
still to introduce a new Customs Code ensuring that all aspects of customs policy
are compatible with WTO rules;
 standards and conformity assessment –introduction of legislation ensuring the
compliance of technical standards with WTO disciplines;
 import licensing and other non-tariff barriers – WTO members are challenging the
WTO-consistency of Russian measures in this area;
 fees and charges on imports –commitment that fees and charges on imports (other
than tariffs) do not afford protection to domestic production and any fees and
formalities associated with import reflect the approximate cost of the services
involved;
 intellectual property protection – effective enforcement by Russia of intellectual
property protection;
 judicial review of administrative decisions –greater clarification as to
administrative and legal bodies in Russia for reviewing administrative decisions
impacting on trade;
 consistency of sub-federal measures with the WTO –commitment from Russia that
trade-related measures will be enforced consistently throughout the country and in a
manner that does not result in unjustifiable restrictions on trade;
 bilateral negotiations are placing particular emphasis on securing Russia's
agreement to:
commit to tariffs at low levels on products of current or prospective export
interest to these countries – at present a number of proposed tariff rates are well
above those currently applied to imports into Russia;
improve market access and reform policies in the services sector – a number of
countries are seeking commitments from Russia to guarantee levels of access
to a number of sectors such as mining-related services, education, financial,
legal and telecommunications.
commit to removal of tariff quotas imposed on imports of meat; and
remove non-tariff measures of concern to foreign industry, such as measures
affecting the importation into Russia of food products.
                                                
5 For a more detail discussion on these concerns, see the website
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/accession/wto_russia.html  maintained by the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
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4 Benefits of Membership
Russia’s primary objectives in a bid to join the WTO is to obtain new trade advantages;
gain access to foreign markets and provision of non-discriminatory treatment for Russian
exporters; access to the international dispute settlement mechanism;6 creation of a more
favorable climate for foreign investments; creation of conditions for growth of domestic
production’ quality and competitiveness as a result of increased flows of foreign goods,
services and investments and; expansion of opportunities for Russian investors in the
WTO-member countries.7
WTO membership would bring clear economic benefits for Russia. Foreign trade has
become increasingly important for the Russian economy, with exports rising from less than
20 percent of GDP in early 1990s to around 40 percent in 2002. In the first quarter of 2003,
crude oil, fuel, gas and metal made up more than 75 percent of total exports, which leaves
the country overly dependent on unstable international commodities markets. In order to
achieve sustaibable economic growth, Russia will have to diversify its exports into higher-
value added goods.
However, being outside the WTO framework has made it unnecessarily complicated
for Russian producers to find new markets as it allows for a more rigorous interpretation of
anti-dumping rules. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Trade, some 120 anti-
dumping actions are currently in place against Russian products, costing the country up to
US$ 4 billion a year. Russia views many of these to be WTO non-compatible. Recent
decisions by the United States and the European Union to classify Russia as a market
economy under antidumping and countervailing duty regimes may not fully alleviate this
problem As it would make Russian subsidies on such public services as gas and electricity
more susceptible to anti-dumping and/or countervailing duty actions.8 Although WTO
membership does not render a country immune to protective action against the producers,
it does provide access to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.
WTO membership would also mean a further liberalization of Russia’s domestic
market. Import penetration is already relatively high, at 24 percent of GDP (compared
with, say, 15 percent in the US). Nevertheless, competitions are severely restricted in a
number of areas and quasi-monopolies often exist on a sectoral and regional basis.
International competition would help to weed out some inefficient producers and create a
level playing field for more dynamic small and medium-sized enterprises.  Russia’s
economy would also benefit from the implementation of WTO rules in areas such as
investment regulations, trade in services and intellectual property. A more transparent
business environment would help to attract much needed foreign investment. In short, the
most tangible benefit of acceding to the WTO would be the improvement of the business
environment.
                                                
6 The importance of this is illustrated by a recent bilateral trade dispute, during which Russia
banned US chicken imports. This prompted threats from the US administration that it might
withdraw political support for Russia’s WTO application.
7 The list is based on various documents prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade of the Russian Federation. See also the website www.wto.ru
8 The EU formally recognized Russia as a market economy on May 29, 2002. Similar recognition
were given by the U.S. on June 6, 2002.
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5 Obstacles to Membership
Since the completion of the Uruguay Round, countries acceding to the WTO have been
held to a higher standard than those that joined in previous years. These include greater
disciplines in tariff levels and agriculture supports; new obligations in rules and
commitments covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), TRIPS,
and the Agreement on Agriculture;  and assuming obligations to a number of agreements,
such as, TBT, customs valuation rules, and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailihng Duties.9 The exact nature of this type of obligations, which require the
enactment of new laws and regulations to meet WTO obligations, depends on the results of
the negotiations.
The main areas of remaining dispute relate to tariff and non-tariff barriers and a
number of trade-related distortions. These can be summarized under the following
headings:
5.1 Tariff Structure
In contrast to many other countries, the Russian WTO accession does not coincide with
any major trade liberalization. Russia liberalized its international trade in early- and mid-
1990s as a part of the IMF stabilization program. Hence the effect of further trade
liberalization will be rather modest [Yudaeva (2002a, 2002b)]. The country’s foreign trade
regime has been characterized by a very complex import tariff structure including both ad
valorem and specific tariffs, a variety of licensing requirements and other qualitative
restrictions as well as export duties payable on exports of gas and oil.10 In the late 1990s,
the weighted average import tariff in Russia was about 13.6 percent with a range from 0 to
30 percent for most commodities [Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997)]. However, the effective
rate was close to 10 percent given the exemptions and pervasive noncollection [Hare
(2002)].11  Table 6 shows the weighted average tariff rates (across all categories of
imported goods) and the actual collection of import duties. The divergence between the
official and actual tariff rate can be attributed to low administrative capacities and
corruption practices.
In early 2001, Russia undertook a major effort to reduce the number of rates in use
and lower the average rate. Currently commodities are divided into four major subgroups –
raw materials, semi-finished goods, food stuffs, and finished products - with marginal tariff
rates of 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent, respectively. Although there are major exemptions
[spirits (100 percent), cigarettes (30 percent), sugar (30 percent) and cars (25 percent)],
these changes have brought the average tariff rate down from 11.4 percent to 10.7 percent
[Stamps (2001)].
Russia is experiencing a strong domestic protectionist movement as a number of
strong lobbying groups are insisting on an increase in tariffs during the accession to
WTO.An example in point would be the auto industry. Russian automakers have proposed
to retain high import duties on foreign cars after WTO accession for a transitional period of
                                                
9 See Self (2002) for a more detail discussion of the core requirements that all countries that accede
to the WTO after the Uruguay round have to satisfy.
10 Brenton et al (1997) presents the official Russian trade-weighted tariffs for 1994 by major
commodity groups.
11 This was much higher than the average external tariff of EU, but not very high by international
standards.
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up to ten years. Bowing to the domestic pressure, in its WTO negotiations, Russia is
proposing initial tariff bindings at levels well above current effective rates while the final
bound rates - after the expiration of 5-7 years of transition period – will be close to the
current effective tariff level [Hare (2002)]. For example, the proposed final bound rate for
agricultural produce and food products are 25 percent as compared to a current tariff of 15
percent. As countries usually lower the tariff rates on accession to the WTO, Russia’s offer
may not be acceptable to the other countries. However, the existing low level of tariff
protection in Russia means that this would not be a source of major concern during the
accession negotiations.
5.2 Energy Prices
Another area of contention is the issue of state control over energy prices. According to
OECD (2002) estimates, industrial subsidies in the form of cheap energy amounted to the
equivalent of about 5 percent of GDP in 2000, thus potentially giving the Russian
producers a comparative advantage over their foreign competitors. The EU and US are
insisting that Russia’s domestic prices for energy resources must be closer to the world
price and that significant reform should be carried out in the energy sector. Russia
contends that lower energy prices are due to its comparative advantage and raising the
domestic price of energy to the world-market levels would make Russian manufacturing
uncompetitive. This proposal is also facing strong opposition from various lobbying groups
within Russia.
5.3 Agriculture
During the early 1990s, Russian agriculture didn’t perform well. However, significant
investment in recent years in large farms run by Russian companies coupled with favorable
weather conditions has enabled food grain production to increase substantially [Tekoniemi
(2003)]. Special WTO regulations allow countries to employ some non-tariff measures,
such as import quotas and subsidies in agriculture. Such subsidies is quite prevalent in
many countries (e.g., USA and the EU). By these standards, levels of subsidies to the
Russian agriculture during the last few years has been relatively low creating a peculiar
problem for the Russian position at the WTO negotiations.12 Countries belonging to the
Cairns Group (Australia, New Zealand and others) want the late 1990s to be used as a
reference point such that the upper limit to the subsidy levels that Russia should commit
would be low. Russia, on the other hand, want to use the late 1980s as the reference point
when applied subsidies were much higher than at present.
Further, given the large scale state-ownership in agriculture, translating Russian
agricultural support measures into traditional WTO classifications of red, yellow and green
light subsidies is difficult.13 Agriculture related issues are currently being discussed in the
Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. So the final conditions for accession are still
fluid.
                                                
12 Subsidy-like measures provided by the regional governments, for example, barter schemes that
allow the exchange of fuel and fertilizers for agricultural crops, are quite common [Amelina
(2000)]. However, these schemes are often not transparent making it difficult to measure the size of
the transaction.
13 See Self (2002) for a discussion of the red, yellow, and green subsidies.
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5.4 Trade in Services
Most WTO members would like to see a significant opening of the Russian service sectors
to foreign-owned business and capital. Most of the service sector, e.g., financial sector, is
either new to the Russian economy or performed a different role during the Soviet period.14
The current negotiating position of Russia is influenced by domestic lobbying groups who
use the infant industry argument in their defense. Russia insists on limiting foreign
presence in a number of service sectors including banking and insurance in order to allow
domestic producers to flourish, and also to retain state monopoly in some areas, e.g.,
telecommunications
Much work also need to be done in the area of intellectual property rights. Copyright
piracy in Russia is rampant and often run by organized crime syndicates. Laws for
protecting intellectual property are weak, lack strong criminal sanctions and are not well
enforced. Hence active steps have to be taken by the state to draw up new laws and
implement and enforce both the new and existing laws before acceding to the WTO.
6 Empirical Estimates of the Effect of WTO Accession15
As discussed in the earlier sections, the major impact of WTO accession will occur through
an improvement in the business environment as it becomes more transparent, accessible,
and less riskier  with a better protection of property rights. A number of studies have tried
to empirically estimate the economic impact of accession on the Russian economy. In the
following sections, the results from various studies are briefly summarized.
Jensen et al (2002) have used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to
show that gains to Russia from WTO accession derive from at least four key effects: (i)
improved access to the markets of non-CIS countries in selected products; (ii) improved
domestic resource allocation since tariff reduction induces the country to shift production
to sectors where production is valued more highly based on import prices closer to world
market prices; (iii) higher Russian factor productivity due to availability of better imported
technologies and techniques from multinational firms that increase their foreign direct
investment; and (iv) positive effects on the growth rate from increases in the rate of return
to capital.
Using the CGE model, they estimate the gains to Russia from WTO accession to be
about 8 percent of Russian consumption (or about 4 percent of GDP) in the medium run,
and as high as 69 percent of Russian consumption (29 percent of GDP) in the long run.
Almost 70 percent of this total gains are due to improved access for foreign investors to the
service sector (around 5 percent of consumption in the short-run). Tariff reduction amounts
to an additional 25 percent of total gains (2 percent of consumption). The rest of the gains
are attributed to productivity effects and improved market access for foreign firms in the
manufacturing sector.16
                                                
14 The service sector includes transportation, telecommunication, education, financial services,
culture and art, public health, sports, science, etc.
15 I would like to thank Ksenia Yudaeva for suggesting the empirical studies published in the
Russian language.
16 A number of econometric studies using firm-level data have shown that the entry of foreign
direct investment in downstream sectors has positive effects on domestic suppliers. See Yudaeva
(2002b) for additional insights on the productivity effects.
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In terms of the sectoral impact, the paper predicts that sectors that currently export or
have little protection, such as, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical and timber, wood
pulp and paper products, will expand while business services will record significant
contraction. However, sectors that are expected to expand are mostly energy-sensitive. So
any reform in the energy sector could significantly affect the paper’s prediction.
Using a model similar to Jensen et al (2002), Zemnitsky (2002) analyzes the impact
of liberalizing the access of foreign firms to the financial sector on labor demand. Given
the rigidity in labor movement in this sector, he shows that labor will gain from
liberalization only if it is mobile. Consequently, he proposes that foreign firms should be
required to employ Russian labor.
Ustenko (2002) uses survey results to investigate the impact on the aluminium
industry of an increase in energy prices following prospective WTO acession. The Russian
primary aluminium producers will gain from accession because of better access to the
world market and higher employment. On the other hand, the expected decrease in import
tariffs will increase competition in the secondary aluminium products market driving some
producers away from the market and increasing unemployment. Domestic consumers will
gain with a decrease in price and increase in quality for secondary aluminium products.
Overall, the findings of the study support the country’s accession to the WTO.
The Higher School of Economics (2002) uses a macroeconomic model to forecast
the effects of WTO accession. The study compares a base scenario (where Russia does not
enter the WTO) with four different variations of Russia’s 2002 tariff offer. The results
indicate that any of the four WTO accession scenarios would lead to a 0.4 percent higher
GDP growth than the base scenario between 2002 and 2010. The difference in effects
under the four separate scenarios is minimal.
CEFIR (2002) published a collection of several studies analyzing different aspects of
the accession process. First, using firm-level panel data, the paper estimates tariff
elasticities of employment of Russian firms. The results show that food and light industry
and machine building  are the most sensitive to changes in tariff. At the regional level, a
uniform 1 percentage point decrease in the tariff rates would lead to a more than 1
percentage point decline in industrial employment in four regions – Evreiskaya,
Ivanovskaya and Kurganskaya oblasts and Adygeya. The remaining regions would
experience a less than proportional decline.
Second, the paper finds inconclusive results on the effect of an increase in
competition with imports on the level of productivity of Russian firms. While
demonstration and incentive effects may have a positive impact, pure competition effect
will be negative. Third, the paper estimates that a decline in tariff rates to 5 percent in
several categories of durable goods  - clothing, construction materials, fabrics, furniture,
household electronic appliances, shoes, and transports – would lower average per capita
household expenditures by 540 rubles, measured in 2000 prices. The rate of decline varies
from a low of 2.7 percent in construction materials to a high of 22.4 percent in household
electronic appliances.
Fourth, using a gravity model, the paper shows that WTO accession will increase
foreign direct investment in Russia by up to US $4 billion. Finally, the paper argues that
liberalization of the entry of foreign banks and trans-border banking activities will
encourage economic growth. In particular, a doubling of the number of foreign banks
operating in Russia will increase economic growth rate by about 1 percentage point, while
a doubling of trans-border credits to non-banking Russian institutions will increase growth
rate by 1.6 percent.
A study sponsored by the National Investment Council (2002) employ an
econometric model (Russian Inter-Industry Model) to measure the impacts of WTO
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accession on a number of sectors and regions. Two scenarios of accession are considered: a
’moderate’ scenario allowing for gradual transition and the phased removal of protectionist
barriers, and a ’worst-case’ scenario implying faster tariff reductions than Russia is
currently proposing. Interestingly, the study finds little difference in the impacts between
fast and phased convergence. Overall, the study did not find any major negative impact on
the national economy. In the worst case scenario, the adverse effect on GNP would be held
to less than one percentage point.
However, impacts within specific sectors and regions could be significantly more
dramatic. Russia stands to benefit from WTO membership through integration into the
international legal framework, which could contribute strongly to Russia’s development of
a coherent system of laws and regulations. This would have a positive impact on the
country’s investment climate. Certain sectors including telecommunications, metallurgy,
footwear, garments, electronics, strong alcoholic beverages, etc. stands to benefit from
accession to WTO. On the other hand, increased competition can be expected in a number
of sectors including, but not limited to, pharmaceuticals, furniture, insurance industry,
retail, and certain parts of the chemical industry.
Finally, the paper tries to identify the regions which are most sensitive to changes in
the tariff policy. Estimations reveal that the following nine regions, with a high import
share of consumption and a high share of industries that are affected by tariff changes, are
most sensitive – Irkutskaya oblast, Kaluzhskaya oblast, Leningradskaya oblast,
Moskovskaya oblast, Moscow, Primorsky kray, Republic of Karelia, St. Petersburg and
Yaroslavskaya oblast. Using Russia’s 2002 offer as the WTO accession scenario, the paper
predicts an increase in GDP from 0.13 percent to 0.67 percent depending on the region,
and an increase in employment from 320 to about 10,000 individuals.
To summarize, the overall results from the empirical studies show a positive effect
on the domestic economy. A number of specific conclusions can also be derived. First, as
the current tariff rate in Russia is already relatively low, a further decline in rates after
WTO accession will not have a significant impact on the economy. On the other hand, a
decrease in non-tariff barriers would have a positive impact. Second, reform in the services
sector is expected to generate significant positive externalities. Third, natural resource
extracting sectors and producers of metals and chemicals are likely to gain the most from
accession, while labor intensive sectors, such as, food and light industries, and machine
building industries would experience the most adverse effect.
7 Concluding Remarks
Prospects for Russia’s membership in the WTO now look better than any point since
accession negotiations began almost a decade ago. Good progress with economic and legal
reforms within Russia has left the country’s economy better prepared for membership.
Nevertheless, the economy still suffers from various weaknesses including, but not
limited to, pervasive subsidies for various sectors through, for example, low energy prices;
absence of a uniform tariff structure; inefficiency in customs administration; lack of
liberalization and foreign participation especially in the service sector; lack of enforcement
of intellectual property rights, etc.
The original timetable for an entry to the WTO by 2003  has slipped. This means that
Russia would not be able to become a full participant in the current ’Doha Round’ of
multilateral trade talks where new regulations on sensitive trade areas, such as, textiles and
agriculture will be discussed.
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But this timescale always looked ambitious, and all the more so after the last few
rounds of tough negotiations on reducing tariffs in key sectors such as autos, aerospace and
pharmaceuticals, or on lifting restrictions on foreign entry into the domestic financial
market. The necessary Russian concessions on some or all of  these matters would mean
overcoming some powerful vested interests at home.
For all their sensitivity, the negotiations on the import tariff levels and access to its
service sectors are the least of the problems, since the negotiating parties can quickly come
to an agreement provided there is sufficient political will on both sides. Delays here will be
mainly due to negotiating tactics.
Much more difficult will be non-tariff barriers, and the general trade-related
legislative framework. Here, the key issues are Russia’s low regulated energy tariffs and
agricultural subsidies. On the legislative front, the Duma has to address relevant
legislations  for WTO accession  including the Customs Code, the liberalization of
currency and controls and, in the area of non-tariff barriers, the law of technical
regulations.
The large number of outstanding issues may well cause further delays in accession.
Resolving the weaknesses would be a complex and painful process. However, given the
importance of WTO-related measures for the overall domestic structural reform, any delay
would be at least marginally negative for investor perceptions of country risk.
Ultimately the advantages of membership outweigh the disadvantages. As pointed
out by many analysts, the disadvantages are mostly tactical, short-term and immediate;
while the advantages are strategic. By joining the WTO following necessary reforms,
Russia can still reap the full benefits of more free trade. It would be a logical continuation
of Russia’s advance towards a full market economy.
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Tables
Table 1.  Main Indicators of the Russian Economy
Macroeconomic indicators
 1996  1997 1998   1999   2000     2001     2002 2003 as of
GDP, % -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.0 4.3
Industrial production, % -4.5 2.0 -5.2 11.0 11.9 4.9 3.7 6.3 1-4/03
Fixed investments, % -18.0 -5.0 -12.0 5.3 17.4 8.7 2.6 10.9 1-4/03
Unemployment, % (end of period) 9.3 9.0 11.8 11.7 10.2 9.0 7.1 8.9 4/03
Exports, $ billion 89.7 86.9 74.4 75.6 105.0 101.9 107.2 29.9 Q1/03
Imports, $ billion 68.1 72.0 58.0 39.5 44.9 53.8 61.0 15.3 Q1/03
Current account, $ billion 10.8 -0.1 0.2 24.6 46.8 35.0 32.8 11.9 Q1/03
Source: Goskomstat, CBR.
Fiscal indicators for federal government
(% of GDP, unless otherwise indicated; end-year figures for debt)
 1996   1997 1998  1999   2000   2001   2002  2003 as of 2003 budget
Revenues 1 12.5 12.3 11.0 12.6 15.5 17.6 20.3 20.6 Q1/03 18.5
Expenditures 1 20.9 19.4 16.9 13.9 14.3 14.7 18.8 17.4 Q1/03 18.0
Balance -8.4 -7.1 -5.9 -1.4 1.2 2.9 1.4 3.2 Q1/03 0.6
Foreign currency debt 31.6 30.2 50.1 87.7 55.3 44.4 36.2
Foreign currency debt, $ bln 136.1 134.6 158.2 154.6 143.4 133.1 123.5
1 Since 2002 social tax is included in the federal budget.
Source:  Budget: IMF 1995-1998, Economic Expert Group 1999-2003.
Debt: IMF 1995-1999, Minfin 2000-2003.
Monetary indicators
1995       1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 as of
Inflation (CPI), 12-month,  % 131           22 11.0 84.4 36.5 20.2 18.6 15.1 13.6 5/03
M2, 12-month growth, % 113           30 29.5 36.3 57.2 62.4 40.1 32.3 42.6 4/03
Average wage, $ (period average, except last) 104        154 164 108 62 79 111 142 161 4/03
Deposit interest rate, % (period average) 102          55 16.8 17.1 13.7 6.5 4.9 5.0 4.3 3/03
Lending interest rate, % (period average) 320        147 32.0 41.8 39.7 24.4 17.9 15.7 13.4 3/03
Forex reserves, $ bln (incl. gold) 17.2       15.3 17.8 12.2 12.5 27.9 36.6 47.8 59.8 4/03
RUB/USD (end of period) 4640       5560 5960 20.65 27.00 28.16 30.14 31.78 30.71 5/03
Source: Goskomstat, CBR.
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Table 2.  Russian Federation: Composition of Merchandise Exports, 2002
In Percent of
Value ($ m.) Total Exports
Total exports (f.o.b.) 100,312
  Food beverage, and agr. products     2,173   2.2
  Stone and ore        580   0.6
  Fuel products   55,737 55.6
      Oil and oil products   38,585 38.5
            Crude   27,445 27.4
            Oil products   11,140 11.1
      Gas   15,359 15.3
      Coal     1,151   1.1
      Other        643   0.6
  Chemicals (inc. Pharmaceuticals)     6,775   6.8
  Leather        186   0.2
  Wood and paper products     4,692   4.7
  Textiles and clothing        654   0.7
  Gems and precious metals     4,760   4.7
  Metals   14,166 14.1
  Machines, equipment, instruments     9,164   9.1
  Other, including ceramics and glass     1,425   1.4
Note: Total trade excludes shuttle trade. Data from Belarus is also excluded.
Source: IMF (2003, Table 31)
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Table 3.  Russian Federation: Destination of Exports, 2002
Total In Percent of
Exports ($ m.) Total Exports
Total exports 106,154
    CIS   15,609  14.7
         Belarus     5,843    5.5
         Kazakhstan     2,413    2.3
         Ukraine     5,853    5.5
         Other     1,501    1.4
    Non-CIS   90,545  85.3
         Europe   59,272  55.8
                Czech Republic     1,509    1.4
                Finland     2,925    2.8
                France     2,649    2.5
                Germany     8,035    7.6
                Hungary     2,167    2.0
                Ireland        260    0.2
                Italy                                              7,432    7.0
                Netherlands     7,267    6.8
                Poland                                          3,719    3.5
                Slovak Republic     2,032    1.9
                Switzerland     5,367    5.1
                UK     3,774    3.6
                Other   12,136  11.4
    Asia   19,043  17.9
                China     6,819    6.4
                Japan     1,803    1.7
                Other   10,420    9.8
    Western Hemisphere    7,447    7.0
                US    3,983    3.8
                Other    3,464    3.3
     Middle East and Africa    4,722    4.4
     Other         61    0.1
Note: Based on exports according to the Direction of Trade Statistics, which differ
somewhat from those compiled by the Central Bank of Russia and given in Table 2.
Source: IMF (2003, Table 30)
Abdur Chowdhury WTO accession: What’s in it for Russia?
Bank of Finland / Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Online 10/2003
www.bof.fi/bofit
18
Table 4 Russian Federation: Composition of Merchandise Imports, 2002
In Percent of
Value ($ m.) Total Imports
Total imports (c.i.f.) 42,103
    Food, beverage, agr. products   9,816 23.3
    Stone and ore      667   1.6
    Fuel products   1,001   2.4
    Chemicals (inc. Pharmaceuticals)   7,305 17.3
    Leather      170   0.4
    Wood and paper products   1,758   4.2
    Textiles and clothing   1,899   4.5
    Gems and precious metals        40   0.0
    Metals   2,591   6.2
    Machines, equipment, instruments 15,180 36.1
    Other, inc. Ceramics and glass   1,676   4.0
Note: Excludes shuttle trade; also excludes data from Belarus.
Source: IMF (2003, Table 33)
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Table 5. Russian Federation: Origin of Imports, 2002
Total In Percent of
Imports ($ m.) Total Exports
Total exports   46,156
    CIS   10,233  22.2
         Belarus     4,054    8.8
         Kazakhstan     1,945    4.2
         Ukraine     3,226    7.0
         Other     1,008    2.2
    Non-CIS   35,923  77.8
         Europe   22,720  49.2
                Czech Republic        560    1.2
                Finland     1,515    3.3
                France     1,892    4.1
                Germany     6,586  14.3
                Hungary        512    1.1
                Ireland        199    0.4
                Italy                                              2,222    4.8
                Netherlands     2,222    2.3
                Poland                                          1,297    2.8
                Slovak Republic        158    0.3
                Switzerland        417    0.9
                UK     1,117    2.4
                Other     5,189  11.2
    Asia     6,792  14.7
                China     2,395    5.2
                Japan        979    2.1
                Other     3,418    7.4
    Western Hemisphere    5,491  11.9
                US    2,972    6.4
                Other    2,519    5.5
     Middle East and Africa       757    1.6
     Other       164    0.4
Note: Based on imports according to the Directioon of Trade Statistics, which differ
somewhat from those compiled by the Central Bank of Russia and given in Table 4.
Source: IMF (2003, Table 32)
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Table 6. Russia’s Import Tariff Rate (in percent)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Nominal weighted average   14   14   12    8
tariff rate
Effective tariff rate    4    7    7    5
(actual duty collected/import)
Source: Gorban et al (2001)
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